Strategic lawsuits against public participation (also known as “SLAPP” suits) are lawsuits intended to censor, intimidate and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of legal defense until they abandon their criticism or opposition.
735 ILCS 110/15 provides a mechanism through which a party to litigation can move to dismiss a lawsuit it feels is a SLAPP. The aforementioned statute and the test for determining whether a particular lawsuit is a SLAPP was the central focus of Glorioso v. Sun-Times Media Holdings, LLC, et al., 2024 IL 130137. The plaintiff in the case, a former employee of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board filed a lawsuit sounding in defamation, false light invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the defendant and one of its reporters following the publication of a series of articles reporting that the plaintiff was under investigation for granting a reduction in the real estate taxes for Trump Tower based on political loyalty to President Trump rather than based on the merits of the case.
Defendants moved to dismiss the case as a SLAPP asserting that the claims raised by plaintiff were solely based on their constitutionally protected political speech activities, that plaintiff’s claims were meritless and that plaintiff had filed them in retaliation for their exercise of their rights. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss and held that the litigation was not a SLAPP. The circuit court decision was affirmed by the appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave for an appeal.
The Court reiterated that the proper test for determining whether a lawsuit is a SLAPP is a three-factor test that asks (1) whether the movant’s acts were in furtherance of his rights to petition, speak, associate, or otherwise participate in government to obtain favorable government action; and (2) whether plaintiff’s claims are solely based on, related to, or in response to movant’s exercise of these rights. If the movant meets its burden on the first two questions, to avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the movant’s acts were not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable governmental action. This is the third prong of the test.
The Supreme Court’s analysis in this case was concentrated on the first prong of the test. The defendant argued that the articles were investigative reports about a public official’s activities that address a matter of public concern. Plaintiff argued that an act of petition, speech or association is not in furtherance of the right to participate in government as contemplated by 735 ILCS 110/15 unless they are aimed at procuring favorable governmental action. The Court held that analysis of this question requires a consideration of whether an objective person would find that the acts undertaken were reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable government action or outcome. Defendants argued that their investigative reports were intended to highlight a matter of public concern to elicit change. However, the court noted that the articles did not contain any language specifically requesting a response or reaction and did not seek any specific action on the part of the voting public. Moreover, the Court noted that unlike previous cases with successful motions to dismiss SLAPP litigation involving “investigative reports”, the subject articles did not involve firsthand reports about investigations in which the defendant was directly involved. As such, the Court held that the subject articles did not constitute litigation in furtherance of government participation and thus affirmed the rulings of the appellate court and circuit courts.
While this case was overall a positive result for the defendant when initiating litigation based on speech, petition or association, local public entities and their employees should take care to ensure that the complaint has merit and is not retaliatory and must be mindful of the fact that parties are permitted to engage in speech, petition or association to procure favorable governmental action.
For more information about this article, contact Tressler attorney Carter Frambes at cframbes@tresslerllp.com.